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PRISONERS' RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
Most Americans have limited, if any, knowledge or concern about
what happens inside of prisons.' Individuals outside prison walls hear
only the most severe and exceptional cases involving inmates' suffering.'
Prisoners often suffer harm beyond segregation from society and loss of
liberty.' For the many prisoners who are forced to endure harsh prison
conditions or treatment, their only relief is the judicial system.' During
the 1996-97 survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided several cases in-
volving prisoners' rights. This survey focuses on five significant cases,
dividing them into two distinct categories. Part I provides a brief back-
ground of prisoners' rights. Part II addresses three cases concerning the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Part III discusses Fourth Amendment claims of unreasonable searches
and seizures.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Courts have unequivocally upheld the notion that incarceration for a
crime does not force a prisoner to entirely sacrifice his constitutional
protections. The prisoner, however, will have fewer rights than he had
prior to his imprisonment.! Courts tend to justify this position based on
1. Michael Cameron Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Prison
Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921, 921
(1992).
2. See id. at 921.
3. Jason D. Sanabria, Note and Comment, Farmer v. Brennan: Do Prisoners Have Any
Rights Left Under the Eighth Amendment?, 16 WHITHiER L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1995).
4. See James E. Robertson, The Constitution in Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights
of Protective Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 101-02 (1987).
5. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997.
6. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). Prison inmates also retain other rights.
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (finding right to be free from creel and
unusual punishment); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-23 (1972) (per curiam) (reaffirming right to
freedom of religion); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (finding a right to petition the
government for redress of grievance and the right of access to the courts); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S.
546, 642 (1941) (holding that incarceration does not deprive prisoners of their right of access to
courts).
7. Tracy McMath, Comment, Do Prison Inmates Retain Any Fourth Amendment Protection
From Body Cavity Searches?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 739, 739 (1987). See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78, 95-97 (1987) (holding that although prisoners retain the fundamental right to marriage, this
right is subject to limitations as a result of incarceration); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555-56 (restating that
prisoners' due process rights are not stripped with incarceration, subject to restrictions consistent
with the legitimate administration of prisons); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974) (de-
termining that regulation preventing media representatives from selecting particular inmates to
interview and forbidding prisoners from initiating interviews did not unconstitutionally infringe
prisoners' First Amendment rights); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (holding that
prisoners only retain rights that do not interfere with penal interests).
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the conventional wisdom that this diminution of constitutional rights is
part of a prisoner's punishment for criminal activity.
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limi-
tation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the con-
siderations underlying our penal system. . . . [A] corollary of this
principle is that a prison inmate retains those ... rights that are not
inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate pe-
nological objectives of the corrections system.!
Despite prisoners' retention of certain constitutional rights, federal courts
have been hesitant to interfere with the administration of prisons.9
A prison regulation unreasonably encroaches upon a prisoner's con-
stitutional rights if it is not reasonably related to the legitimate admini-
stration of the prison.'0 In Turner v. Safley," the U.S. Supreme Court ar-
ticulated a formula to evaluate the reasonableness of penological inter-
ests.'2 According to the Turner test, four factors are relevant in this de-
termination, including (1) whether a rational connection exists between
the prison regulation and the legitimate state interest; (2) whether alter-
native means are available for the prisoners to exercise their rights;'3 (3)
the impact of accommodating the prisoner's exercise of these rights on
other prisoners, guards, and the allocation of prison resources generally;
and (4) the existence of alternate means of achieving the penal interest."
8. Pell, 417 U.S. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
9. Lawrence M. Reich & Ethan E. Litwin, Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 85 GEO.
L.J. 1561, 1561 (1997); see Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299 (1995) (asserting "federal
courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a
volatile environment"); Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (stating that the separation of powers doctrine should
caution judicial intervention in prison administration, an area traditionally governed by the state
legislative and executive branches); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (holding that
courts should exercise judicial discretion rather than assuming that prison administrators are insensi-
tive to prisoners' constitutional rights).
10. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89; see also Reich & Litwin, supra note 9.
I1. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
12. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91; see also Reich & Litwin, supra note 9.
13. The Court rejected a "least restrictive alternative" test where prison officials would be
required to "set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating"
the prisoner's asserted right. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91; accord Thomburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,
401-14 (1989) (adopting the Turner reasonableness standard, as opposed to the least restrictive
alternative test, for regulations restricting inmates' receipt of publications).
14. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90.
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II. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT 5
A. Background
Alexis de Tocqueville toured an American prison in the late 1800s
and "found half of the prisoners chained in irons, and the rest plunged
into an infectious dungeon." 6 De Tocqueville's observations are a vivid
example of the history of brutality in American prisons." Judicial inter-
vention began a new era of refining Eighth Amendment rights.'"
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a precise test by which con-
ditions of confinement are cruel and unusual.'9 The Court, however, has
indicated that "the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which,
although not physically barbarous, 'involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain,' or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the
crime.... Among 'unnecessary and wanton' inflictions of pain are those
that are 'totally without penological justification.' 2. The Eighth
Amendment, drawing its meaning from "the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"'" dictates that condi-
tions of confinement must not result in a serious deprivation of basic
human needs." Unfortunately, the Supreme Court never clearly indicated
which needs are identifiable human needs.'
15. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.




19. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 377 (1981).
20. Id. at 346 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976), Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977), and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), respectively); see also
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 393
(10th Cir. 1977)). The court in Ramos stated:
[T]he Eighth Amendment... is, inter alia, intended to protect and safeguard a prison in-
mate from an environment where degeneration is probable and self-improvement unlikely
because of the conditions existing which inflict needless suffering, whether physical or
mental .... [W]hile an inmate does not have a federal constitutional right to rehabilita-
tion, he is entitled to be confined in an environment which does not result in his degen-
eration or which threatens his mental and physical well being.
Ramos, 639 F.2d at 566 (quoting Battle, 564 F.2d at 393).
21. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
22. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
23. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1181-82. The Supreme Court has explained that the Constitution
does not mandate comfortable prisons. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see also Jeffrey D. Bukowski,
Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the Prohibition Against Cruel and
Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases is Not Beyond the Bounds of History and Prece-
dent, 99 DiCK. L. REV. 419, 434 (1995). The Court has further explained that only those deprivations
which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to support an
Eighth Amendment claim. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Bukowski,
supra. Identifiable human needs include food, warmth, and exercise. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298; see
also Bukowski, supra. However, because prison conditions are allowed to be unpleasant and even
1998] 1057
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Prior to the 1960s, courts followed the "hands-off' approach when
addressing problems within prisons and jails. ' The "hands-off' doctrine
provided that the administration of prisons should be left entirely up to
the unrestrained authority of correctional facilities' administrators and
staff.' The "hands off' doctrine was not so much a rule of law as it was a
policy of judicial hesitation to interfere in the internal administration of
prisons.' Eventually, however, courts began to crack down on prison
officials by identifying and protecting inmates' constitutional rights. '
Through judicial intervention in the 1960s and 1970s, the courts re-
established control over the prisons and jails.' This period between the
1960s and 1970s came to be known as the Rights Period for its focus on
prisoners' rights. '
During the Rights Period, the "deliberate indifference" standard be-
came the governing standard for prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims.0
Because inmates rely on prison officials to provide their basic human
needs, a prison official's "deliberate indifference" to any identifiable
human need may result in violation of the prisoner's Eighth Amendment
rights.' The Supreme Court first articulated the Eighth Amendment stan-
dard of "deliberate indifference" in Estelle v. Gamble."
In Estelle, the prisoner complained that he was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment because he received inadequate treatment for a back
harsh, as they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their violations of the law, a
court should defer to legislative determination of the States to determine what conditions their pris-
ons must conform. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Bukowski, supra, at 434-35.
24. See Jack Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoner's Rights, 59 FED. PROBATION 36, 36
(1995).
25. See id. Deference to prison officials was thought necessary to preserve separation of
powers between the branches of government.
26. Sanabria, supra note 3, at 1134. This judicial hesitation was described in Stroud v. Swope,
187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951), where the court stated, "[wle think that it is well settled that it
is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentia-
ries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined." Stroud, 187 F.2d at
851-52.
27. See Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1178. The lack of publicity from behind prison walls al-
lowed prison officials relative ease in depriving prisoners of their rights. Id. at 1176.
28. Id. at 1178-79. The courts began to scrutinize prison conditions more closely in an effort
to minimize deplorable conditions of confinement. See Sanabria, supra note 3, at 1135. The Supreme
Court expanded the Eighth Amendment far beyond the scope that it had during the hands off period.
Id.
29. See Call, supra note 24. But see Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1178-79 (indicating that the
Rights Period occurred during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren on the United State Supreme
Court). Justice Warren was on the Court from 1953 to 1969. Ralph Adam Fine, Book Review, 70
WIS. LAW. 47,47 (1997) (reviewing CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN (1997)).
30. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1181.
31. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). "It is but just that the public be re-
quired to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for him-
self." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C. 1926)); see
also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,302 (1991).
32. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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injury allegedly sustained while doing prison work." To establish an un-
constitutional denial of medical care, the Court determined that a pris-
oner must prove "deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical
needs."3 ' A prison official exhibits "deliberate indifference" if she knows
that an inmate "face[s] substantial risk of serious harm and disregards
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."' This inter-
pretation alleviates the prisoner's need to show intent and comes close to
equating "deliberate indifference" with negligence on the culpability
continuum. 6 Some courts, however, enforced a stricter standard by
equating "deliberate indifference" with recklessness.37
Thus, courts identified two major levels of neglect in defining "de-
liberate indifference." At the first level, tortiously reckless conduct de-
fines "deliberate indifference."38 Tortious recklessness is a heightened
form of negligence similar to criminal recklessness. 9 To demonstrate the
prison official's deliberate indifference, an inmate must show that the
prison official entertained an appreciation of the high degree of risk re-
sulting from their action or inaction. '
The second level finds "deliberate indifference" when conduct is
criminally reckless.' Under this characterization, prison officials must
33. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
34. Id. at 104.
35. Fanner v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
36. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1181.
37. Id. The Second Circuit, in assessing deliberate indifference, has held that recklessness is
some proof of the requisite degree of intent to cause harm, although an express intent to inflict
unnecessary pain is not required to prove deliberate indifference. See Hendricks v. Coughlin, 942
F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding an Eighth Amendment claim existed when an inmate was
drenched with scalding water while in special housing unit despite requesting a transfer rather than
release into general prison population due to threats from another inmate).
38. See Wright v. Jones, 907 F.2d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 1990).
39. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1183.
40. Id. A number of courts have recently held that the deliberate indifference standard may be
met by proof of repeated negligent acts. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1506 (11 th Cir.
1991) (stating that prisoners can establish prison officials' deliberate indifference to their medical
needs by showing repeated negligent acts).
41. Criminal recklessness is found when
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when [s]he con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or
will result from his [or her] conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to his[or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1270 (6th ed. 1990). Compare Miltier v. Beom, 896 F.2d 848, 852-53
(4th Cir. 1990) (finding deliberate indifference when three doctors ignored a prisoner's complaints
of chest pains, blackouts and shortness of breath, and the prisoner consequentially died from a heart
attack), and Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (identifying deliberate
indifference when prison officials failed to give an inmate liquid diet supplements when the inmate
was unable to ingest solid foods), with Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995)
(finding no deliberate indifference when a prisoner with an ankle injury was forced to work in hard-
soled boots after an x-ray came back negative for fracture or break), and Beny v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d
1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no deliberate indifference when prison officials transported an
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have actual knowledge of the high degree of risk resulting from their
action or inaction."2 Criminal recklessness and intentional conduct are
parallel in this formulation because an inmate must demonstrate that the
prison official was aware of the high risk present and, despite this aware-
ness, deliberately continued in his action or inaction.'
The Rights Period of the 1960s and 1970s found the courts inundated
with prisoner complaints." Consequently, the courts began to abandon
their commitment to protecting prisoners' rights in hopes of freeing up
the dockets." The Court thus returned to a more conservative, "hands
off" approach to prisoners' rights."
The Court's modem approach to prison litigation began in 1979.' In
Bell v. Wolfish," the Supreme Court held that prison policies should not
be questioned so long as they are rationally related to a correctional in-
stitution's legitimate goals. '9 Bell involved body cavity searches of in-
mates which were required after every contact visit with a person from
outside of the institution.' Prison administrators identified the penal in-
terest for the searches as the prevention and deterrence of the smuggling
of contraband.' The Court reversed the holdings of the lower courts and
held that the interest in prison security was of paramount importance and
inmate to a medical center within two hours of the inmate noticing blood in urine and the inmate was
unable to offer proof of harm from delay).
42. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1182-83.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1188.
45. Herbert A. Eastman, Draining the Judicial Swamp: An Examination of Judicial and Con-
gressional Policies Designed to Limit Prisoner Litigation, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 61, 71-73
(1988).
46. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1188. Most recently, Congress passed the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (P.L.R.A.) on April 26, 1996 to address the alarming explosion in the number of frivo-
lous lawsuits filed by state and federal prisoners. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996); see also 141 CONG. REC. S14413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole intro-
ducing the P.L.R.A. in the Senate). "The P.L.R.A. announced a comprehensive restructuring of
remedies available to prisoners in state and federal courts ...." Stacey Heather O'Bryan, Note,
Closing the Courthouse Door: The Impact of the Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury
Requirement on the Constitutional Rights of Prisoners, 83 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1997). Section
803(e) of the P.L.R.A. provides that: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined
in jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury." P.L.R.A. § 803(e), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(2) (West
Supp. 1997); see also P.L.R.A. § 806, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(2) (West Supp. 1997). Although the
P.L.R.A. was enacted just prior to the start of the 1996-97 survey period, few courts have interpreted
the statute. Those that have already vary in their interpretation of the level of injury required.
O'Bryan, supra, at 1213. Legal scholars have questioned the intent of the requirement of a physical
injury. Id. at 1224. Their concern is that the physical injury requirement may prevent legitimate
claims. Id.
47. Call, supra note 24, at 38.
48. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
49. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539.
50. Id. at 558.
51. Id.
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therefore outweighed the inmates' interests in being free from such pro-
cedures."
In Rhodes v. Chapman," the Supreme Court further restricted the cir-
cumstances under which a prisoner may seek relief for his grievances.
The Court reviewed a prisoner's claim that "double ceiling '  inmates
was cruel and unusual punishment." Without conducting an inquiry into
the prison official's state of mind, as in Estelle, the Court determined the
prison officials had not inflicted "unnecessary or wanton pain.'" Consid-
ering the objective seriousness of the alleged deprivation, the Court ac-
knowledged that conditions of confinement, "alone or in combination,"
may amount to deprivation of an inmate's basic necessity, so as to con-
stitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment." In this case, however, the
Court concluded that no constitutional violation occurred. 8
During the most recent Deference Period" the courts tightened the
application of the "deliberate indifference" standard in cases where pris-
oners claimed that prison conditions violated the Eighth Amendment's
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.' In Wilson v. Seiter," the pris-
oner alleged that the conditions of his confinement' violated his Eighth
Amendment rights.6' Wilson extended the "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard to Eighth Amendment attacks on prison conditions by identifying
two requirements that a prisoner must satisfy: a subjective prong and an
objective prong." The subjective prong requires evidence that the prison
official acted with a culpable state of mind and was deliberately indiffer-
ent to the inmate's health or safety.' The prisoner must satisfy the objec-
tive prong by demonstrating a sufficiently serious deprivation.' Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, reasoned that Estelle established the ba-
sis for the subjective part of the test and that Rhodes was the basis for the
52. Id. at 560.
53. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
54. "Double ceiling" is putting more than one prisoner in each cell, which measures only
sixty-three square feet. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 340.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 348.
57. Id. at 352.
58. Id. at 347.
59. The Deference Period saw courts return to a hands-off approach when considering prison-
ers' claims. The courts recognized that prison administrators were in a better position to operate
penal institutions than the judiciary. Call, supra note 24, at 38-39.
60. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1191. For a discussion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, see
supra note 46.
61. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
62. The prisoners alleged overcrowding, excessive noise, inadequate heating, cooling, and
ventilation, insect infestation, insufficient storage space, unsanitary eating conditions, unsanitary
restrooms, and being housed with mentally and physically ill prisoners. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 296.
63. Id.
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objective component. 7 The Court then remanded the case for reconsid-
eration under the two-prong "deliberate indifference" standard."
The Supreme Court's decision in Wilson became a landmark for re-
instituting a policy of deference to prison administrators. ' By defining
"punishment" narrowly, the Court effectively placed prison conditions
outside the scope of the Eighth Amendment and limited the Court's role
in prison reform.7The majority argued that an implicit intent requirement
must be satisfied to show a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition of cruel and unusual punishment." Justice Scalia further articulated
that, by definition, "punishment" involves a "deliberate act intended to
chastise or deter."'2 Thus, Wilson provided that a prisoner making an
Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions must demonstrate that
prison officials acted with at least deliberate indifference, regardless of
whether the conduct was intentionally directed at the prisoner, or
whether it was a result of the general prison conditions."
In Farmer v. Brennan," the Supreme Court further refined this stan-
dard. The Court found that liability attaches to prison officials under the
"deliberate indifference" test only when the officials knew that an inmate
faced substantial risk of serious harm and then did not take reasonable
measures to diminish it." The Court renounced a purely objective test for
determining liability. Instead, the Court applied subjective recklessness. 6
In addition, the subjective Farmer test does not require an inmate who
requests refuge from threatening circumstances to await trauma before
receiving relief." Writing for the majority, Justice Souter indicated that a
67. Id.
68. Id. at 306.
69. Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause--Prison Conditions: Wilson v. Seiter, 105 HARV.





74. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
75. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830-31, 849 (remanding an Eighth Amendment claim charging prison
officials with deliberate indifference when they placed a transsexual inmate, whose behavior re-
flected many feminine characteristics, in the general male prison population, and who was subse-
quently beaten and raped by another inmate).
76. Id. at 835-36. Compare DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding
deliberate indifference when prison officials state of mind indicated recklessness because they had
knowledge of impending harm which would have been preventable), with Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d
557, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no deliberate indifference when secretary negligently left pris-
oner's authorization to attend mother's funeral on desk).
77. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993)); see




prisoner may fulfill the subjective intent requirement by proving that the
risk of harm was obvious."8
The Tenth Circuit has relied on Supreme Court precedent in deter-
mining Eighth Amendment violations by prison officials.'9 In the fol-
lowing cases, the Tenth Circuit adopted the subjective test of the "delib-
erate indifference" standard requiring the prison guard's actual knowl-
edge of a substantial risk, and subsequent disregard of that known risk.
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Northington v. Marin
a. Facts
In February 1990, Northington was serving a sentence at the Denver
County Jail that allowed him to leave the jail to work for a painting com-
pany.8 A deputy at the jail sold Northington a truck, despite a regulation
forbidding deputies from engaging in business relationships with in-
mates.82 As a result of the deputy's conduct, internal affairs conducted an
investigation in which Northington cooperated, ultimately leading to the
dismissal of the deputy. 3 Northington alleged that Deputy Main, an in-
ternal affairs investigator, "assaulted and threatened him to obtain his
cooperation. '" He also alleged that Deputy Marin labeled him as a snitch
in the prison population, causing other inmates to assault him." Nor-
thington based his claims on the Eighth Amendment." The district court
entered judgment against Deputy Marin and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that under the Eighth Amendment, liability
extends to a prison official for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement if the official knows of and disregards a substantial risk of
serious harm to the inmate." The court rejected Deputy Main's argu-
ment that the evidence did not support liability under the Eighth
78. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
79. See Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir. 1995) (addressing the right to be
free from sexual harassment in prison); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 962-63 (10th Cir. 1986)
(determining that prison administrators are not required to administer estrogen as a particular treat-
ment, but do have a duty to address the medical needs of transsexual prisoners).
80. 102 F.3d 1564 (10th Cir. 1996).
81. Northington, 102 F.3d at 1566.
82. Id. at 1566-67.





88. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)).
1998] 1063
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Amendment. " The couri relied on Marin's acknowledgment that it was
probable that if he spread a rumor that an inmate was a snitch, that pris-
oner would likely be beaten by other inmates.' Adopting the magistrate's
finding, the court concluded that Main knew that spreading such a ru-
mor placed Northington in serious jeopardy of assault by other inmates.91
Denying Marin's claim that his motivation was to protect other inmates
from being labeled snitches by association, the court asserted that an
"intent to protect other inmates is not inconsistent with a knowing disre-
gard of a substantial risk to Northington's safety.'"
2. Green v. Branson93
a. Facts
Green filed suit against the warden, physicians, and guards em-
ployed at the Oklahoma State .Penitentiary alleging prison beating and
wrongful medical treatment which occurred in 1993.' Green was an in-
mate at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary when a fight erupted between
him and several prison guards. 95 The cause of the fight was in dispute.9
After the fight, Green returned to his cell and asked for medical attention
for his injuries resulting from the fight.' According to Green, Warden
Reynolds was aware of the beating, but took no action." Additionally,
Green claimed that the prison physician "refused to treat his injuries and
falsified medical documents to help cover up the beating." The district
court granted summary judgment for the prison officials and the court of
appeals reversed on Green's Eighth Amendment claims.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit addressed Green's excessive force claim and held
that "[a] prison guard's use of excessive force is not a violation of the




92. Id. at 1567-68.
93. 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997).
94. Green, 108 F.3d at 1298.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1299. According to Green, he was seeking legal information from another inmate
when a prison guard became impatient and beat him with a stick. Id. The prison guard, however,
claimed that Green initiated the altercation by hitting him with his handcuffs and then falling on top
of him. Green claims that two other prison guards joined the first in kicking, stomping on, and
punching him, and then dragged him by his handcuffs to his cell. Id. The guards denied using any




100. Id. at 1305-06.
[Vol. 75:31064
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
restore discipline,' as opposed to being applied 'maliciously or sadisti-
cally for the very purpose of causing harm."""' The court asserted that
penal institutions should be given deference when reviewing a claim for
use of excessive force."' The court also held that unless it appeared,
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
that there was a wanton infliction of pain, the case should not go to the
jury.
'  3
In Green, a material fact was the question of whether Green pro-
voked the fight with the prison guards. The guards claimed that Green's
alleged provocation of the fight was the reason that the guards used force
to subdue him." The court laid out the parameters for the standard of an
Eighth Amendment claim:
Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a distur-
bance... that indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of in-
mates and prison staff, we think the question whether the measure
taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately
turns on "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very pur-
pose of causing harm.".. . "[S]uch factors as the need for the appli-
cation of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used, [and] the extent of injury inflicted,". . . are rele-
vant to that ultimate determination."'
The Tenth Circuit held that absence of serious injury" was not the de-
ciding factor in determining whether the force inflicted was wanton, and
remanded the issue to be determined by the trier of fact. 7
In addition, the court considered Green's claim that the warden
should be held liable for Green's alleged mistreatment and deliberate
lack of medical care following his fight with the prison guards." The
Tenth Circuit applied the standard that a supervisor's liability is depend-
ent on his "deliberate indifference," rather than mere negligence."'9
Therefore, to be liable, the warden must have known that he was creating
a "substantial risk of bodily harm" to Green."'° Green must prove that "an
'affirmative link' existed between the [constitutional] deprivation and
either the supervisor's 'personal participation, his exercise of control or
101. Id. at 1300 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21(1986)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1301.
104. Id.
105. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) and Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) respectively).
106. The absence of serious injury would be relevant to an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at
1302. See supra note 46 for a discussion of the P.L.R.A.'s requirement of physical injury.
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direction, or his failure to supervise."'" The court held that Green met
this burden."2
Finally, the Tenth Circuit applied the same "deliberate indifference"
reasoning to the prison doctor and his supervisor."' The court determined
that falsification of medical data involves plainly deliberate action and
inaction of a culpable nature, and therefore reversed the summary judg-
ment ruling with respect to the treating physician.'" However, the court
upheld summary judgment with respect to the supervising physician be-
cause an affirmative link did not exist between the constitutional depri-
vation and his failure to supervise. '
3. Barrie v. Grand County Utah"6
a. Facts
Ricks was arrested in Grand County, Utah on October 26, 1991, and
placed in the jail's "drunk tank" after the deputy noted that Ricks had
been drinking alcohol."7 Ricks was permitted to retain possession of the
clothing he was wearing at the time of his arrest, which included sweat
pants with a 38-inch long cord to cinch the waist."' Despite deputies
making two routine cell checks of Ricks's cell without incident, during a
third check deputies found that Ricks had committed suicide by hanging
himself with the sweat pants' draw cord."9
Barrie, as personal representative of Ricks's estate, alleged that
Deputies Walker and Neal subjected Ricks to "unreasonable conditions
of confinement" which violated the Eighth Amendment." In addition,
Barrie asserted that Ricks's family had a liberty interest under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments "in the continued care, comfort and society
of their father and son respectively"'2 ' which had been violated by the
"gross negligence and callous indifference of the defendants."'2
SI 11. Id. (quoting Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir. 1988)); see also Langley v.
Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1481 (10th Cir. 1993).
112. Green, 108 F.3d at 1303.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1304.
115. Id. (quoting Meade, 841 F.2d at 1527).
116. 119 F.3d 862(10th Cir. 1997).
117. Barrie, 119 F.3d at 863.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 863-64.






The Tenth Circuit noted that the treatment of claims based on a jail
suicide is the same as claims based on the failure of prison administrators
to provide adequate medical care for those in their custody.'" In its
Eighth Amendment analysis, the court applied the same constitutional
protection against deliberate indifference to the medical needs of pretrial
detainees as it did to convicted felons.24
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the behavior that amounts to
"deliberate indifference." Quoting Estelle v. Gamble,"n the court con-
cluded that indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners met the
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard. 126 The court further
determined that the degree of fault required was "deliberate indifference"
to a known or obvious risk, and in this case, the defendant's conduct did
not rise to that level. 7
C. Other Circuits
When defining "deliberate indifference," other circuits have applied
the same test established by the Supreme Court. Initially the courts have
evaluated whether there exists a showing of punishment that is an objec-
tively, sufficiently serious risk to the prisoner. To meet this burden, the
prisoner must show that prison officials possessed a sufficiently culpable
state of mind, in that they knew of, yet disregarded, the serious risk to the
inmate's health or safety.
The Second and Fifth Circuits considered Eighth Amendment
claims from prisoners who had been sexually assaulted. The Second Cir-
cuit in Boddie v. Schnieder,12 recognized that severe or repetitive sexual
abuse of an inmate by a prison official "has no legitimate penological
purpose, and is 'simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society.""'  However, the court held that
isolated episodes of harassment and touching were not severe enough to
be objectively, sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth Amendment
123. Id. at 866; see Poham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11 th Cir. 1990) ("Be-
cause jail suicides are analogous to the failure to provide medical care, deliberate indifference has
become the barometer by which suicide cases involving convicted prisoners as well as pretrial de-
tainees are tested.").
124. Barrie, 119 F.3d at 866-67.
125. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
126. Barrie, 119 F.3d at 869 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104).
127. Id.
128. 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1997). Specifically, Boddie claimed that a female prison official
made a statement that he believed to be "a pass" at him. Boddie, 105 F.3d at 859. In addition, he
claimed that the prison official squeezed his hand, touched him inappropriately, and said, "[y]ou
know your [sic] sexy black devil, I like you." Id. at 859-60. Finally, Boddie alleged that the prison
official ordered that he take off his sweatshirt and that she rubbed against him pressing her body
hard against his chest. Id. at 860.
129. Id. at 861 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,834(1994)).
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violation."' The Fifth Circuit determined that "an official's failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,
while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned
as the infliction of punishment."'3
The Third Circuit stated that "[b]eing violently assaulted in prison is
simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their of-
fenses against society."' 2 The Third Circuit asserted that a Department
of Corrections chairperson was aware of a substantial risk to a prisoner's
safety when she reviewed the multi-disciplinary team's unanimous rec-
ommendation to place the prisoner in protective custody.'33 Relying on
Farmer, the Third Circuit explained the type of circumstantial evidence
sufficient to support a finding of actual knowledge on the part of the
prison official.
[I]f an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing that a
substantial risk of inmate attacks was "longstanding, pervasive, well-
documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past," and
the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had
been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus "must have
known" about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a
trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of
the risk. '
The court concluded that the circumstantial evidence of record in
the pending case was essentially identical to the Farmer case. "' There-
fore, because the prison official's actions met the second prong of the
Farmer test, he violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights by
failing to act to ensure the prisoner's safety."
The Fourth Circuit held that an Eighth Amendment claim based on a
deprivation of medical attention is valid only if the medical need of the
prisoner is serious.'3 The court explained that "society does not expect
that prisoners will have unqualified access to health care.""' 8 The court
determined that the pharmacy's failure to deliver the medicine did not
130. Id.
131. Downey v. Denton County, 119 F.3d 381, 385-86 (5th Cir. 1997). The court concluded
that an inmate who was sexually assaulted by an employee of the county sheriff's department, and as
a result had a child, failed to show that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent when the inmate and
the employee were left alone for close to two hours in an unmonitored and unsupervised room. Id. at
386.
132. Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 345 (1981)).
133. Id. at 747.
134. Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,842-43 (1994)).
135. ld. at 748.
136. Id.
137. Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 126 F.3d 589, 609 (4th Cir.
1997) (considering claims from disabled prisoners).
138. Id. at 610.
1068 [Vol. 75:3
1998] PRISONERS' RIGHTS 1069
amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs because
"prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found liable under the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.'
39
The Seventh Circuit relied on criminal recklessness as the standard
to determine "deliberate indifference."'" The court stated that "[miere
negligence or even gross negligence does not constitute deliberate indif-
ference.""' In holding that the removal of an inmate's toenail, without
local anesthetic, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the
court explained that "the Eighth Amendment is not a vehicle for bringing
claims for medical malpractice.''
The Seventh Circuit also recognized that claims brought based on
the deprivation of medical attention may only be valid if the medical
condition is sufficiently serious. 3 In Gutierrez, an inmate brought an
action claiming he received inadequate medical attention for an
infection.'" The Seventh Circuit analyzed several of its sister circuits'
definitions of "sufficiently serious" in the Eighth Amendment medical
care context and recognized that, although a condition did not have to be
life-threatening, a mere ache or pain would not support an Eighth
Amendment claim.'
4 5
Finally, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question of whether a
federal prisoner may bring an Eighth Amendment claim against prison
officials where the prisoner showed no physical harm.'" The court held
139. Id. at612.
140. See Snipes v. Detella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996).
141. Id. at 590.
142. Id.
143. See Gutierrez v. Peters, Ill F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997).
144. Id. at 1365.
145. Id. at 1371-72. Specifically, the court considered the following formulation: "A 'serious'
medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Id. at
1373 (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)). The court also consid-
ered the Ninth Circuit's formulation for when a "serious" medical condition exists: when "the failure
to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the 'unnecessary and wan-
ton infliction of pain."' Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992)).
Finally, the court contemplated the Ninth Circuit's formulation for indications that a prisoner has a
serious medical need: "The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find
important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that signifi-
cantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain."
McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60; see, e.g., Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corrections, 64 F.3d
14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that prison officials cannot be held liable for failing to adjust its
policy to accommodate a "serious medical need" of which it was not made aware); Hill v. Dekalb
Reg'l Youth Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1186 (11 th Cir. 1994) (deciding that a county in which a
prison exists cannot be held responsible for a prison's alleged unreasonable delay in providing
medical attention when it is not shown that the county had any control over the institution).
146. See Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996). The prisoner had been stabbed seven
times in an attack by a gang inside of the prison. Id. at 268. When he was transferred to a new facil-
ity, he discovered that he had not escaped the reaches of the gang. Id. The court considered princi-
ples of tort law to establish the duty that prison officials owe to their inmates. Id. at 271. Because
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that despite the prisoner's fear of physical harm, prison officials had not
violated the Eighth Amendment rights of a prisoner when no harm was
inflicted and there was no indication of malice on the part of prison offi-
cials
The Eighth Circuit found that a serious medical need is one that a
lay-person could easily identify as requiring a doctor's attention.'" The
court held that although a woman's pregnancy generally does not meet
the sufficiently serious standard, evidence of previous rapid labors and
premature deliveries indicative of pre-term labor, would be recognizable
to a lay-person as requiring a doctor's attention.' 9 The court paralleled
the Seventh Circuit in its analysis of the subjective component of an
Eighth Amendment claim, holding that a prison official's culpable men-
tal state may be inferred from circumstantial evidence or from the fact
that the risk was obvious9
D. Analysis
In Northington, the Tenth Circuit, without lengthy discussion, fol-
lowed Supreme Court precedent by applying the Farmer test."' The court
acknowledged that a prisoner was not required to show malicious or
wrongful intent to support liability, as long as evidence is introduced
showing that prison officials knew of, and disregarded, a substantial risk
of serious harm to the inmate.' The court's brevity demonstrates its easy
acceptance of the well-established Farmer standard.'3 However, the
court failed to discuss the prison official's alternatives with respect to the
other inmates when noting that the prison official's intent to protect other
inmates from being labeled snitches by association is not inconsistent
with a knowing disregard of a substantial risk to the plaintiff-prisoner's
safety. A prison official has a duty to protect all inmates under his super-
vision. The court left unanswered what a prison official should do when
the means necessary to protect one or a group of inmates comes at the
expense of possibly endangering another inmate. The court's absence of
discussion about the prison official's options for protecting inmates'
competing interests leaves no guidance for prison officials in such a
situation. By not providing guidelines, the court invites abuse by prison
administrators who choose to exploit the power structure established for
prison security.
there had not been a breach of the duty to protect, in that no harm materialized, the court held that an
Eighth Amendment claim could not stand. Id. at 273.
147. Id. at 267.
148. Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778,784 (8th Cir. 1997).
149. Id. at 785.
150. Id. at 786.
151. Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1567 (10th Cir. 1996).
152. id. at 1567.
153. Id. at 1567-68.
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In Green, the Tenth Circuit followed Supreme Court precedent and
carefully applied the two-prong test established in Farmer.'" However,
by concluding that the doctor exhibited deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's serious medical needs, the court did not provide a discussion
on the defining standard for a "serious" medical condition. The court
duplicated the list of claimed injuries from the plaintiff's complaint, and
held that a refusal to provide medical attention, along with falsification
of medical records, may amount to an Eighth Amendment violation.
Therefore, although the court explained that the falsification of medical
records is highly suggestive of a culpable mental state, it fell short in
dictating guidelines for the first prong of the analysis.
In Northington and Green, the court appeared conscious of the risks
involved to inmates when courts defer to prison administrators. The ad-
ministrations' close contact with inmates creates an atmosphere inviting
direct abuses by prison officials, resulting in denial of inmates' basic
constitutional rights." When prison administrators are permitted to oper-
ate with little judicial scrutiny, they are left with wide discretion.'" Prison
administrators left with wide discretion could easily abuse their power
and punish inmates by, for example, placing them in solitary or maxi-
mum confinement, preventing them from having visitors, and revoking
their playground time.'57
For purposes of an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical
attention, the Barrie court established that there is no difference between
a pre-trial detainee and an inmate in a correctional facility, and adhered
to its earlier decisions rejecting the Seventh Circuit's meaning of deliber-
ate indifference. Though courts have struggled to attach a strict definition
to deliberate indifference, the majority are consistent with the Tenth Cir-
cuit, finding "deliberate indifference" requires less than intentional or
malicious infliction of injury.
The Tenth Circuit, although recognizing the importance of penal
interests, appears to be firm in its position that prisoners retain important
rights while incarcerated. The late 1990s are no longer a time when cruel
and unusual punishment refers only to barbarous conditions. However, in
an effort to divert a free flow of frivolous claims brought by prisoners,
the court was careful to provide and thoroughly discuss the two prongs in
the Farmer test."
154. Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1302-04 (10th Cir. 1973).
155. Nasheri, supra note 16, at 1177.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. As evidenced by the history of the "deliberate indifference" standard, it is very difficult to
apply. Michael Cameron Friedman, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of
Prison Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921,
947 (1992). The terms "deliberate" and "indifference" are contradictory in nature. Id. "Deliberate"
suggests conduct that is considered, planned, or premeditated while "indifference" on the other hand,
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III. UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT'59
A. Background
In 1919, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment entitles inmates to rights, though those rights may be mini-
mal." In subsequent years, the Court addressed which elements consti-
tute a reasonable search and seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capa-
ble of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it re-
quires a balancing of the need for a particular search against the inva-
sion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider
the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is con-
ducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is
conducted. '
6
Today, only the Seventh Circuit has boldly proclaimed that prisoners do
not have privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.
62
The law regarding prisoners is constantly shaping. Although the
Supreme Court established that prisoners retain some of their basic, fun-
damental rights while incarcerated, the lower federal courts have at-
tempted to define more specifically those rights to which prisoners are
entitled. In 1973, the Tenth Circuit upheld a prison's requirement that its
inmates submit to rectal examinations by trained medical personnel prior
to leaving and before returning to the prison. 3 The court identified the
dangers of contraband smuggling as significant justification for its deci-
sion.'"
In 1984, in Hudson v. Palmer,'65 the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to determine whether a prisoner had a "reasonable expectation of
privacy in his cell entitling him to the protection of the Fourth Amend-
suggests the absence of concern or attention. Id.; see Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712, 720 n.7 (I Ith
Cir. 1991), vacated pursuant to settlement (describing the conceptually vague distinction between
deliberate indifference and negligence).
159. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons ...
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..U.." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
160. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1919). In 1962, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its holding in Stroud and again recognized that convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees retain
Fourth Amendment rights. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-44 (1962).
161. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); see, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
162. See Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 150 (7th Cir. 1995).
163. See Daughtery v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292, 294-95 (10th Cir. 1973).
164. Id. at 294.
165. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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ment against unreasonable searches and seizures."'"M The Court balanced
the competing interests of an inmate's subjective expectation of privacy
in his cell, and society's objective determination of the reasonableness of
that expectation." The Court concluded that "society is not prepared to
recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a pris-
oner might have in his prison cell and that, accordingly, the Fourth
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply
within the confines of the prison cell. ' " In addition, the Court explained
that a "right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is funda-
mentally incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of in-
mates and their cells required to ensure institutional security and internal
order."'"M
In 1989, the Tenth Circuit considered whether a prison system had a
legitimate penal interest in extracting a prisoner's blood for AIDS test-
ing."0 The court applied the Turner test to balance the intrusiveness of
requiring a prisoner to submit to blood testing against the interests that
the prison advanced for administering such a test.'' The court concluded
that a rational relationship existed between the prison's regulations and
the blood test, and therefore it passed constitutional muster.
7 2
Despite the express holding in Hudson, the Court entertained pris-
oners' challenges to body cavity searches in the prison setting.1 7 In those
searches, the Court refused to adopt a precise definition of "reasonable-
ness" for Fourth Amendment purposes.' Instead, the Court considered
the circumstances of each case and relied on balancing the "need for the
particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search
entails.""'
In 1995, the Tenth Circuit considered what constituted a random
selection process for requiring inmates to provide urine samples for drug
analysis.'" In Lucero, the court held that correctional facilities may sam-
166. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 519.
167. Id. at 525.
168. Id. at 525-26.
169. Id. at 527-28.
170. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194-96 (10th Cir. 1989).
171. Id. at 1194-96. For a discussion of the Turner test, see supra notes 13-14 and accompany-
ing text.
172. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1194-96.
173. See Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1986) (determining that Hudson does
not subtract essentially from the requirement of reasonableness for body cavity searches set forth in
Wolfish).
174. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,559 (1979).
175. Id. at 559 (stating that "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place where it is con-
ducted").
176. Lucero v. Gunter, 52 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1995).
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pie and test inmates' body fluids when such sampling and testing rea-
sonably related to a legitimate penological interest." '
In the following cases, the Tenth Circuit expands its prior holdings,
allowing prison administrators to sample and test inmates' body fluids.
In reaching its conclusions, the Tenth Circuit used a balancing test to
weigh the minimal intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests against the
legitimate government interests.'78
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Boling v. Romer"9
a. Facts
Plaintiff Boling challenged the constitutionality of a Colorado stat-
ute'" requiring him, as an inmate whose convictions involved a sexual
assault, to provide the state with DNA samples before his release on pa-
role.'' He also challenged the Department of Corrections' policies in
implementing that statute. 2 The district court entered summary judgment
against Boling and the Tenth Circuit held that the search and seizure was
reasonable.' 3
b. Decision
In holding that testing and analysis of DNA from inmates' saliva
and blood samples was reasonable, the court weighed a prisoner's di-
minished privacy rights, the minimal intrusion of saliva and blood tests,
and the legitimate governmental interest in the investigation and prose-
cution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a man-
ner similar to the use of fingerprinting.'' The Tenth Circuit was per-
suaded by similar cases in the Ninth and Fourth Circuits.' Although the
177. Id. at 874. The courts generally give deference to prison officials who can best balance the
constitutional rights of prisoners against penal interests. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 348 (1987).
178. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
179. 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996).
180. The statute provides:
As a condition of parole, the board shall require any offender convicted of an offense for
which the factual basis involved a sexual assault as defined in part 4 of article 3 of title
18, C.R.S., to submit to chemical testing of his blood to determine the genetic markers
thereof and to chemical testing of his saliva to determine the secretor status thereof. Such
testing shall occur prior to the offender's release from incarceration, and the results
thereof shall be filed with and maintained by the Colorado bureau of investigation. The
results of such tests shall be furnished to any law enforcement agency upon request.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-2-201(5)(g)(I) (1997).
181. Boling, 101 F.3d at 1338.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1340.
185. Id.
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court recognized that obtaining and analyzing DNA or saliva of an in-
mate was considered a search and seizure, the court nonetheless held that
such a search was reasonable.'"
2. Schlicher v. Peters8'
a. Facts
In 1992, five Kansas state prisoners challenged the constitutionality
of a Kansas statute allowing for collection of saliva and blood samples
from certain convicted felons for use by the government to detect and
deter recidivists from committing crimes.' After the district court en-
tered an order upholding the constitutionality of the Kansas statute at
issue, Schlicher was the only prisoner to appeal.' 9
b. Decision
Recognizing that the collection, analysis, and storage of saliva and
blood as authorized by Kansas law constitutes a search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Tenth Circuit decided
186. Id. The court considered Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), in which the
Fourth Circuit rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a Virginia statute requiring convicted
felons and prison inmates to submit to DNA testing for inclusion into a data base for use in future
law enforcement. Id. at 302. The court in Jones asserted that, "when a suspect is arrested upon prob-
able cause, his identification becomes a matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim
privacy in it." Jones, 962 F.2d at 306. The Boling Court also harbored Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556
(9th Cir. 1995), in which the Ninth Circuit noted that, "[tihe information derived from the blood
sample is substantially the same as that derived from fingerprinting-an identifying marker unique
to the individual from whom the information is derived." Boling, 101 F.3d at 1340 (quoting Rise, 59
F.3d at 1559). The Rise court also articulated that, "[o]nce a person is convicted of (a felony]... his
identity has become a matter of state interest and he has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in
the identifying information derived from blood sampling." Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560. The distinction
between drawing a person's blood and rolling a person's finger through ink was not held to render
the intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights from DNA testing violative. Id.
187. 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 1996).
188. Schlicher, 103 F.3d at 941-42. In 1991, McColpin, a state prisoner, brought suit alleging
that the defendants, acting under color of state law, violated their constitutional rights. Id. at 942. In
1992, Hutchcraft and Schlicher, both state prisoners, brought suit also alleging that defendants,
acting under color of state law, were violating their constitutional rights. Id. By order of the district
court, these three actions were consolidated. Id. The Kansas statute provides in relevant part:
Collection of specimens of blood and saliva from certain persons; Kansas bureau of in-
vestigation, powers and duties, a) Any person convicted... of an unlawful sexual act as
defined in subsection (4) of K.S.A. 21-3501, and amendments thereto, or an attempt of
such unlawful sexual act or convicted ... because [of murder in the first degree, murder
in the second degree, incest, aggravated incest or abuse of a child] ... regardless of the
sentence imposed, shall be required to submit specimens of blood and saliva to the Kan-
sas bureau of investigation in accordance with the provisions of this act, if such person is:
1) Convicted... of a crime specified in subsection (a)... ; 2) ordered institutionalized as
a result of being convicted ... of a crime... ; 3) convicted ... of a crime specified in
this subsection ... and is presently confined as a result of such conviction.., in any state
correctional facility or county jail ....
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (1995).
189. Schlicher, 103 F.3d at 942.
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that the search and seizure in this case were reasonable.'"° The court
identified the important purpose of DNA testing used to create data
banks to assist the government with solving past and future criminal
acts.9
C. Other Circuits
The Ninth Circuit considered whether a visual body cavity search of
a male prisoner, performed by female prison guards, as well as being
watched by the guards while showering naked, violated the prisoner's
Fourth Amendment rights.'" In Somers v. Thurman, the court discussed
Bell '9 and Hudson,'" and declared that a convicted prisoner retains some
reasonable expectations of privacy while in prison, particularly if the
prisoner is forced to expose himself to guards of the opposite sex. 9
D. Analysis
Critics have questioned whether, in reality, balancing is really bal-
ancing." Instead of balancing competing interests, the Tenth Circuit
merely examined whether requiring inmates to provide saliva and blood
samples was reasonably related to a government interest.'9' Under a true
Fourth Amendment balancing test, the impact of extracting saliva and
blood samples on the physical and psychological well-being of the prison
inmate, as well as the government's needs for obtaining such samples
must be considered." ' By failing to give adequate consideration to the
effect of the intrusion upon the inmate, the balancing test becomes noth-
ing more than an if/then proposition: If there is any government interest
in requiring prisoners to submit to saliva and blood tests, then such a
requirement is valid on constitutional grounds. 9' The result gives wide
latitude to courts to interpret statutes in favor of governmental and pe-
nological interests."
190. Id. at 942-43. The court relied on its recent opinion in Boling, although the court did not
reiterate Boling's analysis. Id.; see supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Boling, 101 F.3d
at 1336 (reviewing the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits' decisions in Jones v. Murray, 962
F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), and Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), which held that statutes
requiring inmates to submit saliva and blood samples for DNA testing did not violate their constitu-
tional protections).
191. Schlicher, 103 F.3d at 942.
192. See Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1997).
193. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
194. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
195. Somers, 109 F.3d at 617-19; see supra notes 46-50 and 150-56 and accompanying text.
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PRISONERS' RIGHTS
The Tenth Circuit's allowance of blood tests, which will yield per-
sonal information about the prisoners, follows Supreme Court decisions.
The Supreme Court has progressively allowed more intrusive prison
searches to come within the realm of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness."' The increasing deference surrendered to prison admin-
istrators has resulted in a decline of Fourth Amendment protections for
prison inmates.'
A "balancing" test, inquiring mainly into correctional facilities' in-
terests, will likely lead prison officials to abuse their power.' These
abuses, inherent in a system fostering close relations between prison of-
ficials and inmates without much judicial oversight, will go unnoticed,
unless flagrant.' The consideration of the intrusiveness of a particular
search will always be outweighed, and the once limited Fourth Amend-
ment protections for prisoners have eroded to almost no protection at
all.'
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit carefully follows Supreme Court precedent in
remaining committed to giving deference to prison administrations. The
court recognizes important societal interests in correctional institutions'
objectives and weighs those interests heavily against prisoners' compet-
ing interests. The court, however, also seems cognizant of the probable
risks if prison administrations were granted unbridled power.
As a result of public policy, many of the court's decisions seem to
protect those who inflict punishment. Actually, the Eighth Amendment
was designed to protect those who are punished.' Therefore it is repug-
nant to the Constitution to determine that "punishment" cannot include
conditions of confinement or treatment without some form of intent on
the part of prison officials."0 Failing to relieve prison conditions that are
barbaric simply because a prison official did not have the proper state of
mind is illogical.' The debate surrounding prisoners' rights undoubtedly
857, 857 (1992). In addition to security, rehabilitation and discipline also outweigh many of prison-
ers' most basic and fundamental rights, in order that those important penal interests may be
achieved. Id. As the courts shift in their trends of deferring to prison administrators, or alternatively
recognizing the consequence of not upholding prisoners' rights, the question, "is balancing really
balancing," can be asked in the other direction. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. The
if/then proposition then becomes: If any conceivable constitutional right is in question, then the
government's penal interests must succumb to constitutional protections for inmates.
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will continue, as the courts struggle to find a balance between a respect
for human dignity and the difficulty of governing prisons.
Lisa Davie Levinson
